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Democratizing the Administrative State 
 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional legitimacy of the 
administrative state. By 1980, a majority of Justices seemed to be poised to hold that 
large portions of the administrative state are unconstitutional. In 1984, the Court stepped 
back from that abyss and took a major step toward legitimating and democratizing the 
administrative state. The Court instructed lower courts to defer to any reasonable agency 
interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute. The Court based this 
doctrine of deference on the superior political accountability of agencies. Henceforth, 
politically-unaccountable judges were prohibited from substituting their policy 
preferences for those of politically-accountable agencies. The Court recognized that 
agencies are politically accountable to the people because they are subject to the control 
of the elected President. 
The Court’s 1984 effort to democratize the administrative state has fallen far 
short of its potential because of temporal problems with the manner in which the 
Supreme Court defines and implements the deference doctrine the Court announced in 
1984 and the other two doctrines that require courts to defer to agency interpretations of 
agency-administered texts. The most important of those deference doctrines is explicitly 
premised on the Court’s understandable belief that policy decisions should be made by 
the politically accountable President rather than by politically unaccountable judges. 
Yet, the Court’s present method of implementing the deference doctrines has two 
unfortunate effects. First, in a high proportion of cases, there is a lag of four to eight 
years between the time that a President takes office and the time when a court is willing 
to acquiesce in implementation of the policies preferred by the President. In other words, 
each President is required to implement the policies preferred by his predecessor for at 
least one term and perhaps even for two terms. Second, in some important situations, 
regulatees are required to incur large costs in enforcement actions  to comply with 
interpretations of agency rules that have already been rejected by the incumbent 
President by the time courts  impose the costs  on the regulatees and that were disavowed 
by the agency at the time the regulatees engaged in the conduct that is the basis for the 
enforcement actions.  
Professor Pierce explains why he believes that these results are unacceptable, 
and he proposes four changes in the Court’s present methods of implementing the 
deference doctrines that will eliminate these effects and that will create a more 
democratic and constitutionally legitimate administrative state in which Presidents 
actually have the power to make changes in policy within the statutory boundaries set by 
Congress. 
 
                                                 
 Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University. I am grateful to _____and the 
participants in a work in progress workshop at George Washington University for providing helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional legitimacy of the 
administrative state.1 By 1980, it appeared that a majority of Supreme Court Justices 
were prepared to outlaw large portions of the administrative state by holding that 
Congress cannot delegate major policy decisions to “politically-unaccountable 
                                                 
1 E.g., John Ely, Democracy and Distrust 131-134 (1980); James Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The 
Administrative Process and American Government 78-94 (1978); Thodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: 
The Second Republic of the United States 93 (1969); Peter Aronson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen Robinson, A 
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 63-67 (1982).  
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bureaucrats.”2 In 1984, however, the Supreme Court unanimously stepped back from that 
abyss and instead took a major step toward legitimating and democratizing the 
administrative state. In its opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the 
Court recognized that Congress has the ultimate power to define the terms it uses in 
statutory texts, but it went on to require a court to defer to any reasonable agency 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute that Congress has instructed the agency to 
implement.3 The Court made it clear that Chevron deference is based on constitutional 
principles that are central to our democratic system of government – politically 
accountable agencies, rather than politically unaccountable judges, should make the 
policy decisions that are necessarily inherent in the process of giving meaning to 
ambiguous texts that Congress has assigned agencies to implement.4   
 The Court anchored Chevron deference in the relationship between agencies and 
the President. Thus, it explained: 
 
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, 
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are 
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of Government to make such policy choices – 
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did 
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the 
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.5 
 
The Court foreshadowed its 1984 recognition of the critical relationship between agency 
policy decisions and the elected President in a 1983 opinion: 
 
The agency’s changed view .  .  .  seems to be related to the election of a new 
President of a different political party.  .  .  . A change in administration brought 
about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an 
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and 
regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by 
Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in 
light of the philosophy of the administration.6 
 
The Court’s methods of applying the Chevron doctrine and the other doctrines 
that require politically unaccountable judges to defer to politically accountable agencies 
                                                 
2 In his concurring opinion in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the Occupational Safety and Health Act was unconstitutional because it was an 
impermissible attempt by Congress to delegate a major policy decisions to “politically-unaccountable 
bureaucrats.” 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980). The four-Justice plurality seemed to agree with Justice Rehnquist 
when they concluded that the statute would be unconstitutional were it not for the plurality’s decision to 
give it a saving construction. 448 U.S. at 646.      
3 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984). 
4 467 U.S. at 865-866. 
5 467 U.S. at 865-866. 
6 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Assn. V. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 
(1983) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Powell & O’Connor).    
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regularly yield results that are inconsistent with the Court’s attempt to infuse the 
administrative state with principles of democracy, however. As applied by the Supreme 
Court, the deference doctrines typically require a court to defer to the policy preferences 
of a President who left office years ago rather than to the policy preferences of the person 
who was elected to replace him. As a result of the Court’s decisions with respect to the 
scope of the deference doctrines, a newly-elected President has little chance of 
announcing any of his policies in a form that a Court is willing to accept as worthy of 
deference during a single term in office, and a President is unlikely to be able to obtain 
judicial acquiescence in all of his preferred policies even if he is re-elected for a second 
term. 
Chevron deference is implicitly based on the assumption that an incumbent 
President obtains control of the federal bureaucracy immediately upon taking the oath of 
office. That is well known to be a counterfactual assumption, however. It typically takes 
many months for a newly-elected President to get “his people” installed in all of the 
agency policy making positions. It then takes those neophyte political appointees many 
more months to figure out what the agency is doing and to begin to implement the 
policies the President prefers.  
When the incumbent’s preferred policies differ from those of his predecessor, the 
process of changing policy is difficult and time-consuming. The President’s appointees 
must identify and implement means of reversing the powerful inertial forces that have 
developed in the permanent bureaucracy in support of the policies that were preferred by 
the President’s predecessor in office. Even when the newly-elected President strongly 
disagrees with a policy adopted by his predecessor, it may well take him a year or more 
just to begin the process of switching to a policy that he, and presumptively a majority of 
the electorate, prefer. Once the President’s appointees begin the process of attempting to 
announce and to implement policies that are consistent with the President’s preferences, 
they often confront procedural hurdles that typically take years to overcome before the 
President’s policy preferences can be announced in a manner that courts are willing to 
accept. 
 My goal in this article is to explore some of the issues courts encounter when they 
are required to review agency policy decisions during a period in which an agency is in 
the process of changing from the policies preferred by a prior President to the policies 
preferred by the incumbent. I then suggest ways of addressing those issues that are 
consistent with the constitutional bases for the deference doctrines as well as with other 
important principles of administrative law and constitutional law. I use two contemporary 
disputes to illustrate the kinds of questions that arise when a court is required to resolve a 
policy dispute during such a time of transition.  
First, I discuss the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences.7 
In that decision, the Court refused to defer to the interpretation of an ambiguous agency-
administered statute urged by the Solicitor General (SG) on behalf of the Bush 
Administration and instead upheld the contrary interpretation previously adopted and 
applied by the agency during the Clinton Administration. Second, I discuss some of the 
many court opinions that have been handed down to date in the ongoing multi-billion 
dollar dispute with respect to the meaning of the word “modification” contained in the 
Clean Air Act. In resolving that dispute, a court must choose whether to defer to an 
                                                 
7 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2004). 
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interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute adopted by the agency in a 
rule issued in 2003 or to a 1999 agency interpretation of a pre-existing ambiguous agency 
rule. The 2003 rule reflects the policy preferences of President Bush, while the inherently 
inconsistent 1999 interpretation of the ambiguous pre-existing rule reflects the policy 
preferences of President Clinton. 
 In part II, I discuss the deference doctrines that are important in resolving policy 
disputes of this type, their bases, their scopes, and their corollaries. In part III, I describe 
the policy dispute that the Supreme Court addressed in Dow and the opinions in which 
the Court resolved that dispute. I then critique the Court’s opinions. I conclude that the 
Court’s decision was entirely consistent with prevailing doctrine, but I am troubled by the 
Court’s rejection of the policy preferred by the incumbent President and its approval 
instead of the policy preferred by his predecessor even though the incumbent was elected 
to replace his predecessor over four years prior to the Court’s decision.  
In part IV, I describe the policy dispute that numerous lower courts have 
addressed with respect to the meaning of “modification” in the Clean Air Act, as well as 
the court opinions that address those disputes. I then critique the courts’ opinions. I 
conclude that a court that resolves that dispute by applying prevailing doctrines, as the 
Supreme Court presumably will do in the next few years, will also reject the policy 
preferred by the incumbent in favor of the policy favored by his predecessor. I am 
troubled by that result both because of the long time lag between the election of a 
President and judicial acquiescence in his preferred policies and because it seems patently 
unfair in the context in which the dispute is being addressed by courts. In the many 
ongoing enforcement proceedings, EPA is urging courts to require electric utilities to 
incur many billions of dollars of regulatory costs by adopting a statutory interpretation 
EPA first urged in 1999 during the Clinton Administration, even though EPA urged the 
utilities to engage in the conduct that allegedly triggered these massive regulatory 
obligations by adopting announcing a contrary statutory interpretation in 1980 and EPA 
formally rejected the 1999 Clinton Administration interpretation in favor of the pre-
existing 1980 Carter Administration interpretation in 2003. It does not seem right to 
impose many billions of dollars of regulatory costs on firms for engaging in conduct that 
would not have been required under the interpretations in effect at the time the firms 
engaged in the conduct or at the present time.  
Finally, in part V, I propose changes in doctrine that would respond to the two 
problems I identify. I propose one means of reducing the long lag time between the 
election of a President and judicial acquiescence in the policies he prefers. At present, the 
Supreme Court instructs lower courts to defer to a policy announced by an agency 
through the process of giving meaning to an ambiguous statute only when the agency 
announces the policy in a legislative rule or a decision issued in a formal adjudication. It 
typically takes several years for an agency to take either of those highly formalized 
actions. I urge the Supreme Court to adopt instead the proposal of Justice Scalia. He has 
long argued that the Court should defer to a policy announced by an agency whenever it 
represents the agency’s “fair and considered judgment on the matter in question,” even if 
the agency makes the announcement through use of a procedure less formal than a 
legislative rule or a decision issued in a formal adjudication. Adoption of that approach 
would reduce by several years the present intolerably long lag between the election of a 
new President and judicial acquiescence in his preferred policies. 
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I propose three ways of avoiding the unfairness of subjecting firms to high costs 
attributable to agency claims in enforcement proceedings that an ambiguous agency rule 
means something dramatically different from the meaning the agency attributed to the 
rule when the firms engaged in the conduct at issue in the enforcement proceedings and 
the meaning the agency is now giving the rule. I attribute that result to the Supreme 
Court’s 1944 instruction to lower courts to give “controlling effect” to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous agency rules. To avoid the potential unfair results this 
doctrine of deference can create, I urge courts to adopt three practices that already have 
considerable support in the case law. Courts should refuse to defer to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous agency rules in three circumstances: (1) when the 
interpretation is announced as a litigating position and there is reason to believe that it 
does not represent the “fair and considered judgment of the agency on the matter in 
question;” (2) when the agency is interpreting an open-ended rule that merely repeats the 
vague language of the statute the rule purports to implement; and, (3) when the agency 
interpretation of the rule would require a regulatee to incur large regulatory costs and the 
interpretation urged in the enforcement proceeding is inconsistent with the interpretation 
in effect at the time the regulatee took the actions at issue in the enforcement 
proceedings. 
                          
II. THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES 
 
A. Chevron Deference 
 
 There are three deference doctrines that a court might be required to apply when it 
reviews an agency policy decision that takes the form of an interpretation of an 
ambiguous provision in an agency-administered text. The Chevron doctrine requires a 
court to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous agency-
administered statute if the agency has adopted the interpretation in a legislative rule or a 
formal adjudication.8 Chevron deference is based on constitutional principles – politically 
unaccountable judges can not overrule policy decisions made by politically accountable 
agencies.9 
 
B. Skidmore Deference 
 
If an agency announces an interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered 
statute through use of a procedure less formal than a legislative rule or a formal 
adjudication,10 the agency interpretation is due the weaker and more contingent type of 
deference the Court announced in its 1944 decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.11 Under 
Skidmore, the deference due an agency interpretation varies “with circumstances, and 
courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and 
                                                 
8 Chevron deference also applies to some uncertain class of agency interpretations announced through use 
of less formal procedures, but the Court has not explained how it will identify the other circumstances in 
which Chevron deference is due an agency interpretation. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-231 
(2001). 
9 437 U.S. at 865-866. 
10 533 U.S. at 229-231. 
11 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  
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relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”12 Skidmore 
deference is based on an agency’s comparative advantage in terms of its subject matter 
expertise, rather than on an agency’s comparative advantage with respect to its political 
accountability.13 
 
C. Seminole Rock Deference 
 
 Seminole Rock deference applies to an agency’s interpretation of one of its rules, 
rather than to a statute the agency administers.14 Seminole Rock deference is about as 
strong as Chevron deference.15 In Chevron, the Court instructed courts to uphold any 
agency interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute as long as it is 
reasonable, i.e., not arbitrary and capricious.16 In Seminole Rock, the Court instructed 
reviewing courts to give an agency interpretation of an agency rule “controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”17 Those two deference 
rules are stated in slightly different ways, but they are functionally indistinguishable.18 
The Court did not describe the basis for Seminole Rock deference in its 1945 opinion, but 
the Court has identified two bases for the doctrine in its subsequent opinions. Sometimes 
the Court says that Seminole Rock deference is based on the same constitutional/political 
accountability considerations as Chevron deference.19 In other cases, the Court says that 
it is based on the same considerations of relative subject matter expertise as Skidmore.20  
 
D. Differences Between the Deference Doctrines 
 
 The courts have announced corollaries to two of the deference doctrines that 
logically follow from the quite different bases for each. Thus, for instance, Chevron 
deference applies only to a statutory interpretation adopted by an agency that Congress 
has authorized to make policy decisions in the process of implementing a statute;21 
Chevron deference does not apply when an agency adopts an interpretation of a statute 
based on the agency’s interpretation of court opinions;22 and, Chevron deference applies 
with as much strength to an agency decision to change its interpretation of an ambiguous 
agency-administered statute as to an agency decision to adhere to a previously announced 
interpretation.23 Each of those corollaries follows logically from the basis for Chevron 
deference. An agency that does not have the power to make policy decisions is not 
entitled to judicial deference when it exceeds its statutory authority by attempting to 
make a legally binding policy decision, and an agency that adopts a statutory 
                                                 
12 533 U.S. at 229-230; 323 U.S. at 139-140. 
13 323 U.S. at 139-140; 533 U.S. at 229-231. 
14 325 U.S. at 413-414. 
15 John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency 
Rules, Colum. L. Rev. 612, 627-629 (1996).. 
16 467 U.S. at 843-844. 
17 325 U.S. at 413-414. 
18 Manning, supra. note 15, at 627-629. 
19 501 U.S. at 696-697. 
20 Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144,151 (1991). 
21 499 U.S. at 151. 
22 Akins v. FEC, 101 F. 3d 771 (D.C. Cir. en banc 1996).  
23 517 U.S. at 742. 
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interpretation based on its interpretation of judicial decisions is not entitled to deference 
because its interpretation is not based on a policy decision.  
The last of the three corollaries to the Chevron doctrine is particularly important. 
By instructing courts to confer as much deference on changes in pre-existing agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes as on reaffirmations of long-standing 
interpretations, the Supreme Court recognizes the need to allow any newly elected 
President to change government policies within the boundaries set by Congress. It would 
be inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of democratic government to force a 
President to adhere to the policies of his predecessor when Congress has written a statute 
that delegates policy making power to an agency in terms that permit a President to adopt 
either his preferred policies or those of his predecessor. People vote in Presidential 
elections because they prefer one candidate’s policy preferences to those of his opponent. 
The courts should not be in the business of blocking implementation of the policies 
presumptively preferred by the electorate except in the rare case in which those policy 
preferences violate the Constitution.   
By contrast, the Skidmore doctrine makes the extent of the deference due an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute depend to some 
extent on the agency’s consistency in interpreting the statute over time.24 That approach 
to deference makes sense when deference is based on an agency’s presumed comparative 
advantage with respect to the specialized subject matter expertise required to apply a 
statute to a complicated field of science. Inconsistency in an agency’s treatment of the 
same scientific dispute naturally tends to reduce the credibility of the agency’s claim of 
superior subject matter expertise. If the Food and Drug Administration, for instance, 
expresses the same opinion with respect to some important scientific principle every two 
years over a period of forty years, any judge is more likely to accept the agency’s opinion 
on that issue than if the agency vacillates between two inconsistent opinions every other 
year for forty years. 
 The Court has not said much about the role of consistency in deciding whether to 
defer to an agency’s interpretation of an agency rule. The Court’s failure to address that 
question in a definitive way fits with the Court’s multiple explanations for the Seminole 
Rock doctrine. To the extent that Seminole Rock deference is based on an agency’s 
presumed superior political accountability for policy decisions, the doctrine should apply 
with equal strength to new interpretations that change pre-existing interpretations as to 
interpretations that an agency has consistently held over a long period of time. By 
contrast, a court should confer more deference on an agency’s consistent and 
longstanding interpretation of a rule than on an agency’s recently announced change in its 
interpretation of the rule if Seminole Rock deference is based on an agency’s presumed 
superior expertise with respect to the subject matter of the rule. 
 In the next two parts of this article, I will describe the two policy disputes that I 
have chosen to illustrate the kinds of problems courts confront when they are required to 
review agency policy decisions at a time when agency policymaking is in transition from 
one presidential administration to another and the opinions courts have issued to grapple 
with those issues. I will then critique those opinions. In each case, I will begin with a 
doctrinal critique of the opinions. I will ask the question whether the reasoning and result 
in each case is based on an accurate application of prevailing doctrines. In that part of my 
                                                 
24 323 U.S. at 139-140; 533 U.S. at 229-231. 
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critique, I will assume that prevailing doctrines make sense in their substance, scope, and 
corollaries. In the second part of my critique, I will discuss the question whether 
prevailing doctrines should be changed in some way. 
  
III. THE SCOPE OF EPA PREEMPTION OF STATE PESTICIDE REGULATION 
 
A. The Policy Dispute 
 
 The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) authorizes the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate pesticides.25 FIFRA requires a 
manufacturer to apply to register a pesticide with EPA. The statute instructs EPA to 
approve an application to register a pesticide if, but only if, EPA determines that the 
pesticide “will not cause unreasonable effects on humans and the environment.”26 The 
manufacturer must include its proposed product labeling with its application, and the 
statute instructs EPA to approve the proposed labeling if, but only if, it complies with the 
statutory prohibition on mislabeling.27 
FIFRA also pre-empts some, but not all, state regulation of pesticides. Like most 
preemption provisions in statutes that authorize a federal agency to regulate some subject 
matter, the preemption provision in FIFRA is extremely difficult to interpret and apply, 
particularly in the context of the forms of indirect state regulation that are accomplished 
though use of tort suits based on state law. FIFRA authorizes a state to regulate a 
federally-registered pesticide by prohibiting its use for some purpose that would 
otherwise be permissible pursuant to its federal registration and/or by approving its use 
for some purpose that otherwise would not be authorized by its federal registration as 
long as the state-authorized use is not prohibited by the federal registration.28 In addition 
FIFRA has another preemption provision that has produced a great deal of litigation: 
“Such state shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or 
packaging in addition to or different from those required under this statute.”29 
EPA has taken several actions that relate to the scope and effect of the statutory 
prohibition on state labeling requirements that are in addition to or different from the 
EPA-approved labeling of a registered product. First, in 1978 EPA sought and obtained 
from Congress a statutory amendment that empowered EPA to waive the pre-existing 
statutory requirement that it register a pesticide only if it determined that the pesticide 
was effective for its intended use.30 EPA convinced Congress that it lacked the resources 
required to determine whether a pesticide was effective or to evaluate the efficacy claims 
a manufacturer made in its proposed labeling. In 1979, EPA exercised the waiver power 
Congress granted it by issuing a rule in which it waived all regulation of pesticide 
efficacy.31 In a 1996 public notice, EPA confirmed that it had “stopped evaluating 
pesticide efficacy for routine label approvals almost two decades ago,” and that “EPA’s 
approval of a pesticide label does not reflect any determination on the part of EPA that 
                                                 
25 7 U.S.C. §136 et seq. (2000). 
26 7 U.S.C. §136a(c)(5)(C),(D). 
27 7 U.S.C. §136a(c)(5)(B). 
28 7 U.S.C. §136v(a),(c). 
29 7 U.S.C. §136v(b). 
30 125 S.Ct. at 1796.  
31 Id. at 1796. 
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the pesticide will be efficacious or will not damage crops or cause other property 
damage.”32   
In 2000, the Clinton-era EPA interpreted the FIFRA prohibition on state labeling 
that is in addition to or different from EPA-approved labeling not to pre-empt state tort 
suits that are based on alleged misbranding of a pesticide where the alleged misbranding 
relates to efficacy, crop damage, or other property damage. EPA announced that 
interpretation in the form of two amicus briefs EPA filed in state courts.33 In 2003 and 
2004, the SG under President Bush announced that “the United States” had determined 
that it had erred when it earlier interpreted FIFRA to be consistent with such state tort 
actions.34 In two amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, the SG stated that “the 
United States” now interprets FIFRA to prohibit such state tort suits. The SG explained 
that the government’s change in its interpretation of FIFRA was based on its examination 
of several judicial opinions in which courts had rejected EPA’s earlier interpretation.35 
          
B. Supreme Court Opinions Addressing the Pesticide Regulation Pre-emption Issue 
 
Scores of court opinions address the pesticide regulation pre-emption issue 
described in part IIA.36 I will describe only the opinions issued in the case that reached 
the Supreme Court in 2004. That dispute arose as a result of crop damage allegedly 
caused by a pesticide named Strongarm made by Dow. Dow applied to register 
Strongarm for application to peanut crops. Dow proposed labeling that included the 
statement: “Use of Strongarm is recommended in all areas in which peanuts are grown.”37 
EPA granted the application for registration and approved the proposed labeling. When 
peanut farmers in west Texas applied Strongarm to their crops, it allegedly stunted the 
growth of the peanuts because of its interaction with soil with a ph in excess of 7.0.38 
After the farmers complained to Dow, it reregistered Strongarm with a new label that 
included the statement: “Do not apply Strongarm to soils with a ph in excess of 7.2.”39 
The peanut farmers who had already suffered crop damage attributable to their use of 
Strongarm on peanut crops grown in high ph soil then sued Dow in state court for, inter 
alia, failure to warn and fraud.40 The farmers claimed that Dow knew that Strongarm 
would damage peanut crops grown in high ph soil and affirmatively misled farmers by 
stating in its labeling that Strongarm should be used in all soil conditions.41 
Dow filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court in which it argued that 
the farmers’ complaint under state tort law was pre-empted by FIFRA. The district court 
granted summary judgment for Dow, and the Fifth Circuit upheld that decision.42 The 
circuit court reasoned that application of state tort law to the facts of the case would 
                                                 
32 Id. at 1796. 
33 Id. at 1794. 
34 Id. at 1801. 
35 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences page 20.  
36 See cases discussed in id. 
37 125 S.Ct. at 1793.  
38 Id. at 1793. 
39 Id. at 1793. 
40 Id. at 1793. 
41 Id. at 1793. 
42 332 F. 3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003).  
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violate the statutory prohibition on state required  “labeling .   .   . in addition to or 
different from” the labeling required by EPA because a jury verdict against Dow based 
on fraud or failure to warn “would induce it to alter its product label.”43 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the circuit court.44 The Supreme Court 
held that a state tort verdict against Dow based on failure to warn or fraud is not pre-
empted by FIFRA as long as state tort law imposes a duty to warn that is equivalent to the 
FIFRA prohibition on mislabeling.45 FIFRA defines mislabeling to include false or 
misleading statements or inadequate instructions, so the Court thought it was entirely 
plausible that state tort law would impose labeling requirements equivalent to the 
requirements imposed by FIFRA. 
The Court rejected the interpretation urged upon it by the SG for several reasons. 
First, it rejected the SG’s argument that the statute unambiguously pre-empts all tort 
actions based on failure to warn.46 The Court concluded that “imposition of state 
sanctions that merely duplicate federal requirements is equally consistent with the text .   
.   .”47 It characterized the government’s interpretation as “particularly dubious given that 
just five years ago the United States advocated the interpretation that we adopt today.”48  
Second, the Court noted that “for much of [the period in which FIFRA has been in effect] 
EPA appears to have welcomed these suits”49 because they “would seem to aid, rather 
than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA.”50 Third, the Court rejected the government’s 
argument that any labeling requirement imposed by state tort law necessarily would be 
“in addition to or different from” the labeling EPA approved because EPA specifically 
disavowed any role in approving labeling based on considerations of product efficacy or 
risk of damage to crops – the subjects of the state tort complaint.51 Fourth, after 
concluding that the statute was ambiguous, the Court applied the canon of construction 
that requires a court to interpret ambiguous language in a statute in a manner that 
disfavors pre-emption.52 Finally, the Court noted that: “State law requirements must be 
measured against any relevant EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA’s misbranding 
standards.”53 
Three Justices wrote two separate opinions in Dow. In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Breyer emphasized the final point the Court made in its opinion – that the pre-
emptive effect of an agency-administered statute depends critically on the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute: 
 
[A]n administrative agency .   .   . ha[s] the legal authority within ordinary 
administrative constraints to promulgate agency rules and to determine the pre-
emptive effect of those rules in light of the agency’s special understanding of 
                                                 
43 Id. at 331. 
44 125 S.Ct. 1788.  
45 Id. at 1802-1803.  
46 Id. at 1797-1799. 
47 Id. at 1797. 
48 Id. at 1801. 
49 Id. at 1803. 
50 Id. at 1802. 
51 Id. at 1802. 
52 Id. at 1801. 
53 Id. at 1803-1804. 
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“whether (or the extent to which) state requirements may interfere with federal 
objectives.”54 
 
Justices Thomas and Scalia stated their agreement with the Court’s opinion in most 
respects but they expressed their disagreement on one important point: 
 
[T]he majority states that the presumption against pre-emption requires choosing 
the interpretation .  .  . that disfavors pre-emption. .  .  .  That presumption does 
not apply, however, when Congress has included within a statute an express pre-
emption provision.55 
 
 
                          C. Doctrinal Critique of the Dow Opinion 
 
With one exception, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dow is doctrinally sound. 
The Court began by concluding that the pre-emption provision of FIFRA that prohibits a 
state from imposing a pesticide labeling requirement that is in addition to or different 
from a labeling requirement imposed by EPA is ambiguous in its potential application to 
a tort suit in which a party alleges that the pesticide manufacturer committed fraud or 
failed to warn of a known adverse effect of a use of the pesticide in the form of the risk of 
damage to crops caused by the pesticide.56 That conclusion was well-supported in the 
Court’s opinion. The Court reasoned that if applicable state tort law imposes a duty to 
warn that has the same meaning as FIFRA’s prohibition on mislabeling a pesticide, the 
action of a state court in enforcing the duty to warn is not in addition to or different from 
the requirements imposed by FIFRA.57 In that entirely plausible situation, the Court 
reasoned that: “The imposition of state sanctions for violating state rules that merely 
duplicate federal requirements is equally consistent with the text of [that pre-emption 
provision]”58 and that: “[p]rivate remedies that enforce federal misbranding requirements 
would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA.”59 
The Court refused to defer to the SG’s interpretation of FIFRA to pre-empt all 
state tort actions that are based on an alleged failure to warn.60 The Court’s refusal to 
confer Chevron deference on the SG’s interpretation was doctrinally sound on three 
different bases. First, courts have consistently held that Chevron deference is due only a 
statutory interpretation adopted by the agency Congress has charged with responsibility 
to make the policy decisions required to implement a statute.61 Congress has given EPA, 
not the SG, that policymaking power. Second, the Supreme Court has held that Chevron 
deference is due only an agency interpretation announced in a legislative rule or an 
opinion issued in a formal adjudication.62 The SG’s interpretation was announced only in 
                                                 
54 Id. at 1804. 
55 Id. at 1806. 
56 Id. at 1797. 
57 Id. at 1798-1801. 
58 Id. at 1797. 
59 Id. at 1802. 
60 Id. at 1801. 
61 499 U.S. 144; Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §3.5 (4th ed. 2002). 
62 533 U.S. at 229-231. 
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a brief, and Congress has never authorized any agency to make a legally binding decision 
in the process of writing a brief. Third, courts have held that a court never owes Chevron 
deference to an agency interpretation that is based on the agency’s analysis of judicial 
decisions, rather than an agency policy decision,63 and the SG stated that his 
interpretation was based on his analysis of prior court opinions that had rejected EPA’s 
interpretation.64  
The Court was also on firm doctrinal grounds when it declined to confer Skidmore 
deference on the SG’s interpretation. The SG’s interpretation fails to qualify for 
deference by reference to all of the criteria the Court uses to decide whether to confer 
Skidmore deference on an agency interpretation.65 The SG announced his interpretation in 
an informal instrument. The SG has no comparative advantage vis a vis a court with 
respect to the subject matter of FIFRA regulation. The SG’s interpretation was not a long 
and consistently held interpretation, rather, it contradicted EPA’s long-held contrary 
interpretation. Finally, the SG’s interpretation was not supported with persuasive 
reasoning; instead of discussing the policy reasons in support of his interpretation, the SG 
referred only to his agreement with an opinion of the California Supreme Court. 
After the Court concluded that the FIFRA pre-emption provision is ambiguous 
and after it refused to defer to the SG’s interpretation of that provision, the Court invoked 
the canon of construction that requires a court to interpret pre-emption provisions 
narrowly to support its interpretation of the pre-emption provision of FIFRA.66 That was 
a doctrinal error. As Justices Scalia and Thomas pointed out in their separate opinion,67 
the canon of construction the Court invoked applies only when a statute is silent or 
ambiguous on the question of whether Congress intended to pre-empt state law. The 
Court does not apply that canon when Congress explicitly preempts state actions and the 
question before a court is the scope of that pre-emption provision. As Justice Breyer 
emphasized in his separate opinion,68 when Congress includes a pre-emption provision in 
an agency-administered statute, and that provision is ambiguous with respect to its 
potential application to some class of state actions, the Court defers to any reasonable 
agency interpretation of the ambiguous pre-emption provision.69 
That doctrinal flaw in the Court’s opinion in Dow is harmless, however, for two 
reasons. First, it had no effect on the outcome of the proceeding, as the separate opinions 
of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer recognize. Second, even though the Court based 
its interpretation of the statute on an inapplicable canon rather than on deference to the 
agency, the Court made it clear that it was greatly influenced by the agency’s 
interpretation. The Court referred to EPA actions that influenced its decisionmaking in 
three different passages. First, it referred to EPA’s 1996 Notice that it had not regulated 
labeling claims related to crop damage in decades to refute the argument that a plaintiff’s 
victory based on an alleged failure to warn about risks to crops would conflict with 
                                                 
63 101 F. 3d 771. 
64 Brief, supra. note 40, at page 20. 
65 The criteria for application of Skidmore deference are set forth at 323 U.S. at 138-140 and 533 U.S. at 
229-231.  
66 125 S.Ct. at 1801.  
67 Id. at 1806. 
68 Id. at 1804. 
69 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000);United States v. Locke, 592 U.S. 89 (2000). 
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EPA’s implementation of FIFRA.70 Second, the Court rejected the argument that 
allowing the state tort action to proceed would frustrate the purposes of FIFRA by 
referring to the fact that, until the SG decided to change the government’s position, “EPA 
appears to have welcomed these tort suits.”71 Third, the Court ended its opinion with the 
recognition that: “[s]tate law requirements must also be measured against any relevant 
EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA’s misbranding standards.”72 
I am confident that the Court would retreat quickly and unanimously from the one 
instance in which its opinion in Dow is doctrinally flawed if it were presented with a case 
in which invocation of the narrowing canon conflicted with deference to a reasonable 
agency interpretation of the FIFRA pre-emption provision. If, for instance, EPA were to 
issue a rule in which it announced that it was resuming its pre-1979 practice of regulating 
pesticide labeling with reference to the risks that pesticides pose to crops and that it 
considered all pesticide labeling requirements imposed by states to be impermissible 
impositions of requirements “in addition to or different” from the labeling requirements 
EPA determined to be required by FIFRA, I am confident that the Court would uphold 
that rule as a reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous pre-emption provision of 
FIFRA.73     
                                                 
70 125 S.Ct. at 1796, 1802. 
71 Id. at 1803. 
72 Id. at 1803-1804. 
73 A hypothetical variation on the facts of Dow will suffice to illustrate my point. Imagine that Congress 
increases EPA’s resources to implement FIFRA to the extent necessary for EPA to return to its pre-1979 
practice of regulating the efficacy of pesticides and the risks that pesticides pose to crops. Imagine that 
EPA then revokes the waiver it issued in 1979 and announces that, henceforth, it will investigate with care 
the efficacy of each new pesticide that is the subject of a pesticide registration application and that it will 
approve the labeling of any such pesticide if but only if it concludes that all claims of efficacy are accurate 
and that any risks the pesticide poses to crops are disclosed in the labeling EPA approves for the pesticide. 
Imagine that EPA then issues a rule in which it states that, as a result of the changes EPA has made in its 
methods of implementing the FIFRA prohibition on misbranding, EPA has concluded that any labeling 
requirement imposed by a state through any means, including a tort suit based on failure to warn or fraud, is 
inherently “in addition to or different from” FIFRA’s if the state attempts to impose that requirement on a 
pesticide the labeling of which EPA approved after it announced the expansion in the scope of its 
regulation of pesticide labeling. EPA explains further that its new comprehensive method of regulating 
pesticide labeling will be most effective if it is exclusive and uniform, and that allowing state judges and 
juries who lack any relevant expertise to second-guess EPA labeling decisions would create a chaotic 
regulatory environment in which pesticide manufacturers would not know which of several potentially-
conflicting authorities to follow; pesticide manufacturers would incur unnecessary costs by having to 
comply with as many as fifty-one different labeling regimes, and consumers would confront a bewildering 
array of  labels and warnings, many of which are based on some lay judge or juror’s mistaken beliefs about 
the characteristics of a pesticide.  
I have no doubt that the Supreme Court would ignore the Court’s erroneous reference to the 
inapplicable canon of construction in Dow in this hypothetical situation. It would instead apply the 
reasoning in the Thomas, Scalia, and Breyer opinions as the basis for a unanimous holding that FIFRA pre-
empts any tort action against a pesticide manufacturer that is based on an alleged failure to warn users 
about risks to crops if the suit is brought against the manufacturer of a pesticide the labeling of which was 
approved by EPA after it began to regulate the contents of proposed labeling related to risks of crop 
damage. Several passages in the Court’s opinion foreshadow this resolution of my hypothetical variation on 
the facts of Dow. The Court notes that FIFRA “pre-empts competing state labeling standards,” id. at 1803; 
that FIFRA pre-empts “any statutory or common-law rule that would impose a labeling requirement that 
diverges from those set forth in FIFRA and its implementing regulations,” id. at 1803; and, that “[to the 
extent that EPA promulgates such regulations in the future, they will necessarily affect the scope of pre-
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                                     D. Normative Critique of the Dow Opinion 
 
 In the preceding section, I criticized the Court’s opinion in Dow for relying on an 
inapplicable canon of construction, rather than on deference to EPA, as the basis for its 
holding that FIFRA does not preempt a state tort action that is based on an alleged failure 
to warn of a known risk to crops posed by a pesticide. I went on, however, to conclude 
that the opinion was doctrinally sound if the reasoning of the three concurring Justices is 
substituted for the erroneous reasoning in that part of the Court’s opinion, with no 
resulting change in outcome. In this section, I will broaden the bases for my critique to 
include the question whether the doctrines that the Court properly applied are 
normatively appropriate in their substance and scope. 
 I find little to criticize in the substance of the doctrines the Court applied in Dow. 
Generally, the doctrines are well thought out and fit well in the context of a government 
in which agencies make a high proportion of policy decisions under broad authority 
delegated by Congress subject to supervision by the politically accountable President and 
review by politically unaccountable courts. I am concerned about one of the effects of the 
application of those doctrines in Dow, however. The Court rejects the policy preferred by 
the incumbent President and upholds instead the policy preferred by his predecessor, 
even though the incumbent replaced his predecessor over four years before the Court 
decided the case. I am concerned that the doctrines we have adopted may not be 
normatively appropriate if, and to the extent that, they frustrate the will of the electorate 
by increasing substantially the time between the election of a President whose policy 
preferences differ from those of his predecessor and the time when he is able to replace 
his predecessor’s policies with those he prefers. I believe that we can improve the fit 
between the deference doctrines and the performance of our democracy by changing the 
scope of the deference doctrines. 
 
E. Potential Changes in Doctrine 
 
  
One potential change in doctrine would require a reviewing court to defer to the 
SG’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision in an agency-administered statute when 
the SG adopts, announces, and urges on a court an interpretation that differs from the 
agency’s interpretation. Justice Scalia suggested that courts should defer to 
interpretations urged by the SG in amicus briefs in his concurring opinion in Christensen 
v. Harris County.74 That change in doctrine would have had the effect of requiring the 
court to uphold the incumbent President’s preferred policy rather than the policy 
preferred by his predecessor in Dow.  
                                                                                                                                                 
emption,” id. at 1804 n. 28.  That opinion would be entirely consistent with, and required by, all of the 
current administrative law doctrines. It would be analogous to the Court’s opinions in Geier v. Honda 
American Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), and United States v. Locke, 592 U.S. 89 (2000).  
74 529 U.S. at 591. Justice Scalia qualified his position, however, by referring to a situation in which the SG 
represents that the head of the agency responsible for administering the statute at issue has adopted the 
interpretation urged by the SG. It is not clear that he would defer to the SG’s interpretation in a case like 
Dow, in which the SG makes no representation that EPA has adopted the interpretation the SG urges. 
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Deferring to the SG, rather than the agency, has one appealing characteristic when 
measured with reference to the political and constitutional values that provide the 
underpinnings of Chevron deference. The SG typically is one of the members of an 
Administration who is particularly close to the President. When the SG supports a policy 
that differs from the policy adopted by an agency, the policy urged by the SG is far more 
likely to reflect the President’s policy preferences than the policy adopted by the agency. 
Moreover, even if the SG and the agency share a preference for the policy that is 
preferred by the President, the agency cannot announce its preference in a form that 
entitles it to Chevron deference for several years after the agency adopts that preference. 
The Supreme Court has instructed reviewing courts to confer Chevron deference only on 
agency interpretations announced in legislative rules or in decisions issued in formal 
adjudications. It usually takes years for an agency to announce a new policy consistent 
with the President’s policy preferences in a notice and comment rulemaking or a formal 
adjudication.75 By contrast, the SG can announce a statutory interpretation that reflects 
the President’s policy preferences in the briefs he files with courts shortly after the 
President takes office. 
 On balance, however, I believe that it would be a mistake to adopt a doctrine of 
deference to the SG. Such a doctrine would have many disadvantages. The Chevron 
doctrine recognizes and gives effect to the power of the President in the overall context of 
a constitutional democracy in which Congress has the ultimate power to make the vast 
majority of policy decisions.76 In that context, Chevron deference makes sense. The 
President is not the only politically-accountable institution, however. Congress is also 
politically-accountable, and its preferences trump those of the President when Congress 
acts through use of the legislative process, as the Court recognized in step one of the two-
part Chevron test.77 It would not be consistent with recognition of legislative supremacy 
to extend Chevron deference to SG interpretations of agency-administered statutes. 
Congress has never delegated to the SG the power to make the policy decisions necessary 
to implement FIFRA. 
 Another potential change in doctrine would broaden the scope of Chevron 
deference to include agency interpretations adopted and announced through use of 
procedures less formal than a notice and comment rulemaking or a formal adjudication. 
Since 2000, Justice Souter and Justice Scalia have engaged in a lively debate about the 
appropriate scope of Chevron deference.78 Justice Souter has urged the Court to confer 
Chevron deference only on agency interpretations announced in legislative rules, formal 
adjudications, and some uncertain set of less formal procedures if Congress has indicated 
an intent to authorize an agency to announce a legally binding interpretation through use 
of that procedure.79 Justice Scalia has urged the Court to confer Chevron deference on 
                                                 
75 See Richard Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59 (1995) 
(describing the multi-year process required to issue a major rule); Richard Pierce, The Choice Between 
Rulemaking and Adjudication for Formulating and Implementing Energy Policy, 30 Hastings L. J. 1 (1979) 
(describing the multi-year process required to complete a major formal adjudication). 
76 The Court said that: “First, always is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 467 U.S. at 842.   
77 Id. at 842.  
78 See Richard Pierce, 2005 Cumulative Supplement to Administrative Law Treatise §3.5.   
79 533 U.S. at 229-231. 
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any agency interpretation announced through any means as long as it represents the 
agency’s “fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”80 So far, Justice 
Souter has been successful in persuading a majority of the Court to adopt his views on the 
appropriate scope of Chevron deference.81  
My focus on the temporal effects of administrative law doctrines places the 
Souter-Scalia debate in a new light. The narrow scope of Justice Souter’s approach to 
Chevron produces a situation in which a newly-elected President with policy preferences 
that differ from those of his predecessor is unlikely to get most of his preferred policies 
approved by courts and in effect in his first term in office. He probably will not be able to 
get all of those policies approved even during his second term if he is fortunate enough to 
be re-elected. By contrast, Justice Scalia’s broader approach to Chevron would allow a 
President to get most of his preferred policies approved and in effect within a couple of 
years of taking office. Since Chevron deference can yield judicial approval of a policy 
only if the agency can convince a court that the policy it has announced is reasonable and 
is within the boundaries Congress has established by statute, I believe that the Court 
could further the political and constitutional goals of Chevron far more effectively if it 
were to modify the Chevron doctrine by adopting Justice Scalia’s approach to its scope.82 
                                                 
80 Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 591 (2000). For a longer version of Justice Scalia’s views on 
this issue, see his dissenting opinion in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 239-250.  
81 533 U.S. 218. 
82 While I believe that the results of the Court’s opinion in Dow illustrate the desirability of a change in the 
scope of Chevron, I do not believe that any defensible change in doctrine would change the outcome of the 
particular dispute the Court resolved in Dow. As I argued in section IIIC, I believe that the Court would 
have upheld an interpretation of FIFRA in which EPA announced both that it had resumed responsibility to 
regulate pesticide efficacy, including the accuracy of proposed labeling as it relates to efficacy and risk of 
crop damage, and that EPA’s approval of a proposed pesticide label preempts a state tort suit based on 
alleged fraud or failure to warn. See supra. note 73 and accompanying text.  I believe that EPA would have 
no difficulty persuading the Court that such a change in policy is reasonable and within the statutory 
boundaries on its discretion. That change of policy would require a large increase in the resources made 
available to EPA for pesticide regulation, however.  
The Bush Administration did not attempt to make that change in policy. Instead, the Bush 
Administration attempted to change EPA’s policies by retaining EPA’s pre-existing refusal/inability to 
regulate pesticide efficacy, including its inability to review the accuracy of proposed pesticide labels as 
they relate to efficacy and risk of crop damage, while simultaneously announcing that all state regulation of 
pesticide labeling related to efficacy and risk of crop damage is pre-empted. I do not believe that EPA 
would be able to convince a court that such a peculiar combination of policies is either reasonable or 
consistent with the statutory boundaries on its discretion.  
When Congress prohibited a state from imposing a labeling requirement “in addition to or 
different from” labeling required by FIFRA, Congress assumed that EPA would regulate each aspect of a 
pesticide’s labeling, and Congress included the labeling pre-emption provision in FIFRA to obtain 
uniformity in regulating pesticide labeling. I have no doubt that EPA could choose to regulate pesticide 
labeling as it relates to efficacy and risk to crops and prohibit states from engaging in duplicative and 
potentially conflicting regulation of that subject matter if Congress gave it the resources required to 
perform that task. In that situation, pre-emption of all state regulation of labeling would further the 
statutory goal of assuring uniformity in regulating labeling. I do not believe that EPA would be acting in a 
manner consistent with FIFRA, however, if it continued to refuse to regulate an important aspect of 
pesticide labeling and simultaneously asserted that states lack any power to regulate that area.When 
Congress limited state regulatory power in FIFRA, by prohibiting states from imposing labeling 
requirements “in addition to or inconsistent with” EPA labeling requirements, it was attempting to further 
the goal of obtaining uniformity and consistency in pesticide regulation. Congress was not attempting to 
create a legal regime in which no institution at any level of government can regulate labeling claims related 
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               IV. THE MEANING OF MODIFICATION IN THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
 
A. The Policy Dispute 
 
In 1970, Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA) that applied 
expensive New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) to all major new stationary 
sources of air pollution, including coal-fired generating plants.83 Old generating plants 
were exempt from the new requirements, however. Congress believed that owners of old 
plants should not be required to engage in expensive retrofitting of old plants that were 
likely to be retired from service in the near future. Thus, the NSPS requirements applied 
only to new plants or plants that had been modified. The statute defined a modification as 
“any physical change in, or change in the operation of, a stationary source which 
increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source.  .  .  .”84 In 1977, 
Congress enacted another amendment to CAA that implemented a Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) program that requires any owner of a major stationary 
source constructed after 1977 to obtain a special permit and to comply with expensive 
new air pollution control rules.85 The 1977 amendment defined construction to include 
modification and followed its reference to modification with a parenthetical “(as defined 
in [the pre-existing NSPS provision of CAA]).”86  
Congress did not anticipate much controversy about the meaning of modification 
in these two amendments. Congress assumed that most of the old, relatively high-
polluting coal-fired generating plants would be retired within a few years after the 
enactment of the amendments. That assumption proved to be mistaken. Most of the pre-
existing coal-fired plants are still in operation today, primarily because they are the 
lowest cost source of electricity in the country. Indeed, those plants generate more 
electricity today than when Congress amended CAA in the 1970s, and they account for 
over half of the electricity consumed in the United States today.87 All of those plants have 
been the subject of engineering projects that have rendered them quite different from the 
plants that existed in the 1970s.88 The typical pre-existing coal-fired generating plant now 
has greater capacity to generate electricity and lower emissions of pollutants per unit of 
electricity generated. The question that has arisen repeatedly with respect to virtually all 
of the old coal-fired plants is whether the major construction projects that allow the plants 
to generate more electricity with lower per unit emissions constitute modifications within 
                                                                                                                                                 
to the efficacy of a pesticide or to the risk that it will cause crop damage, thereby leaving farmers with no 
source of legal protection from damage attributable to fraud or intentional mislabeling by pesticide 
manufacturers. 
83 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).  
84 42 U.S.C. §7411(a)(4). 
85 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977); Clean Air Act Technical 
and Conforming Amendements, Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1393 (1977). 
86 42 U.S.C. §7479. 
87 President of the United States, National Energy Policy, Report of National Energy Policy Development 
Group xiii (2000). 
88 See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F. 3d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 2005) (Duke Energy 
implemented 29 major engineering projects on coal-fired plants between 1988 and 2000. The projects cost 
as much as seven times the original cost of constructing the plant.)  
 19
the meaning of the PSD provisions of CAA. If they do, they were illegal when they were 
implemented and the owners of the plants must now either retire each plant or retrofit 
each with extraordinarily expensive new pollution control technology. 
EPA issued rules that define modification in 1971,89 1975,90 1978,91 1980,92 
1992,93 and 2003.94 With three exceptions, however, none of those rules addressed the 
most important recurring issue that arises in EPA’s dealings with owners of old coal-fired 
generating plants. The statute defines a modification as a “change .  .  . which increases 
the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source.”95 What if the owner of a facility 
implements a project that allows the facility to decrease the pollutants it emits per unit of 
electricity generated but that also allows the facility to generate so much more electricity 
that the aggregate quantity of some pollutant emitted by the facility increases even 
though the per unit quantity of the pollutant emitted actually decreases substantially? 
Does that qualify as an “increase” in emissions of a pollutant that causes implementation 
of the project to become a “modification,” thereby triggering the expensive NSPS and 
PSD requirements of CAA? 
The 1971, 1978, and 1980 EPA rules that defined modification did not address 
that issue. The 1975 rule addressed the issue by excluding from the definition of a 
“change” that might otherwise qualify as a modification “[a]n increase in the hours of 
operation or in the production rate.”96 The 1975 rule applied only to the definition of 
modification in the NSPS provisions, however, and not to the definition in the PSD 
provisions.97  
The 1992 rule applied to both NSPS and PSD. It excluded from the definition of 
modification any increase in emissions that was caused by increased demand for the 
output of a facility that was independent of any physical change to the facility.98 No court 
ever resolved the dispute with respect to the legality of that rule, however, and the rule 
did not apply to the scores of engineering and construction projects that facility owners 
implemented before 1992. Facility owners challenged the validity of the 1992 rule, but 
the D.C. Circuit stayed the review proceedings to allow EPA to complete a new 
rulemaking that ultimately produced the 2003 rule.99  
The 2003 rule also applies to both NSPS and PSD. It retains parts of the 1992 
rule, but it has two changes which, in the aggregate, reduce significantly the number of 
facilities and projects that qualify as modifications. It allows a facility owner to use its 
emissions in any year within a ten-year lookback period to compare its past emissions 
with its present or future emissions to determine whether its emissions have increased 
rather than the two-year lookback period that previously applied.100 It also reaffirms the 
                                                 
89 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876 (Dec. 23, 1971). 
90 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416 (Dec. 16, 1975). 
91 43 Fed. Reg. 26,380 (June 19, 1978).  
92 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980). 
93 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992). 
94 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186 (Dec. 31, 2002). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). 
96 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(iii)(f). 
97 411 F.3d at 545-546. 
98 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314. 
99 New York v. EPA, 413 F. 3d 3,16 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
100 57 Fed. Reg. at 90,278. 
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exclusion for demand growth and expands that exclusion to cover other facilities in 
addition to electric generating plants.101 The 2003 rule was upheld in a 2005 D.C. Circuit 
opinion.102 By its terms, however, the 2003 rule does not apply to any activity that took 
place prior to 2003.103 Indeed, it cannot apply retroactively because the Supreme Court 
issued an opinion in 1988 that prohibits agencies from issuing rules with retroactive 
effects.104 
Shortly after it issued its 1980 rule, EPA interpreted its definition of modification 
for PSD purposes to allow a facility owner to implement a project that had the effect of 
increasing its aggregate emissions of a pollutant only because of increased output from 
the unit without obtaining a PSD permit or otherwise complying with the expensive PSD 
requirements. EPA took the position that a project caused an increase in emissions only if 
it had the effect of increasing the emissions per unit of output.105 EPA did not announce 
that interpretation in a rule or a formal adjudication, however. EPA’s Director of the 
Division of Stationary Source Enforcement announced the interpretation in the context of 
decisions declining to take enforcement actions against facilities that implemented 
projects that increased total emissions because of increased output but that reduced 
emissions per unit of output.106 The 1980 interpretation of modification was an important 
part of President Carter’s effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on expensive and 
politically insecure sources of imported oil by increasing consumption of inexpensive 
domestic coal supplies.107 
In 1999 and 2000, however, EPA initiated a large number of highly publicized 
enforcement actions against virtually all owners of coal-fired generating stations.108 
Those actions were a major part of President Clinton’s effort to reduce air pollution. In 
each action, EPA alleged that the facility owner had acted illegally during the 1980 to 
1999 period in implementing projects that had the effect of increasing aggregate 
emissions of one or more pollutant from each facility. In each case, the project had not 
increased emissions per unit of output; emissions had increased solely because the facility 
was being used to produce more electricity. EPA alleged that the projects constituted 
modifications within the meaning of that term as it is used in the 1980 PSD rules because 
the projects enabled the owner to increase the rate of utilization of the facility, thereby 
increasing aggregate emissions from the facility. In each case, the facility owner 
defended its past conduct by arguing that a project implemented with respect to an old 
coal-fired generating plant qualified as a modification for PSD purposes only if the 
project produced an increase in emissions of pollutants per unit of output, which was not 
the case with respect to any of the scores of old plants that had undergone major projects 
between 1980 and 1999. 
 
                                                 
101 Id. at 80,277. 
102 New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3. 
103 68 Fed. Reg. at 61,264. 
104 Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988). 
105 411 F. 3d at 545-546. 
106 Id. at 545-546. 
107 President Carter’s plan to reduce U.S dependence on imported oil by substituting coal for oil is 
described in Richard Pierce, Gary Allison & Patrick Martin, Economic Regulation: Energy, Transportation, 
and Utilities 445-451, 837-868 (1980)   
108 U.S. v. Alabama Power Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d  1283, 1285 (N.D. Ala. 2005). 
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           B. Court Opinions Addressing the Dispute About the Meaning of Modification              
  
Between 2003 and 2005, five courts issued opinions in which they reviewed EPA 
interpretations of modification, as that term is used in the context of the CAA PSD 
provisions. In opinions issued in 2003, two district courts decided that Congress had 
unambiguously resolved the question of the meaning of modification and, thus, that EPA 
had no discretion with respect to the meaning of the term and a court owed no deference 
to any EPA interpretation of the term. Those courts resolved the issue of law in 
inconsistent ways, however.109 The District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina held that EPA was required to define modification to exclude a project that 
increased emissions only because it enabled the facility to increase its output,110 while the 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that EPA was required to define 
modification to include such a project.111 By contrast, all three of the court opinions 
issued in 2005 concluded that the statutory term modification is ambiguous. Those 
opinions were issued by the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,112 the 
Fourth Circuit,113 and the D.C. Circuit.114 
 In United States v. Alabama Power Co., the District Court for the Northern 
District of Alabama was required to determine the meaning of modification in the context 
of an enforcement proceeding in which EPA was urging the court to hold that a firm 
violated the PSD provisions of CAA by implementing projects during the period 1980-
1999 that increased aggregate emissions from facilities only because the firm increased 
its rate of output from the facilities.115 EPA could prevail only if the court accepted 
EPA’s 1999 interpretation of modification, rather than its 1980 or 2003 interpretation. 
The court first concluded that the term modification is ambiguous.116 The court then 
stated that: “[a]s an abstract principle, the court agrees with EPA  .  .  . that deference is 
due the EPA in the agency’s interpretation of the CAA’s .  .  .  increased emissions 
provisions.”117  
The court then turned to the question of which of the inconsistent EPA 
interpretations were entitled to deference. It refused to defer to the interpretation 
announced in EPA’s 2003 rule.118 The court noted that the 2003 rule, by its terms, applies 
only to conduct that took place after the rule was issued, while all of the conduct at issue 
in the case before the court took place well before 2003.119 The court also refused to defer 
to the 1999 interpretation EPA urged in its brief.120 The court reasoned that an 
                                                 
109 As the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama characterized the two opinions: 
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interpretation announced in a brief is not entitled to Chevron deference but only to the 
weaker and more contingent form of deference described in Skidmore.121 The court 
concluded that it should not confer Skidmore deference on that agency interpretation 
because it was inconsistent with both the informal interpretation EPA announced in 
declining to take enforcement actions in 1980 and the formal interpretation EPA 
announced in its 2003 rule.122 The court was particularly troubled by EPA’s argument 
that a court should defer in 2005 to an interpretation that was inconsistent with the 
agency’s prior interpretation and that the agency had formally rejected in the rule it 
issued in 2003. In the court’s words: 
 
Finally, if one compares the 2003 Rule .  .  .  . with this civil action, what one sees 
is one office of EPA attempting to expand and clarify the .  .  . provisions [that 
exempt facilities from PSD] through rulemaking, while another is attempting to 
redefine them through enforcement actions and litigation.123                                   
                                              *    *    * 
This leaves the anomaly of utilities, like APC, being prosecuted for conduct that, 
if engaged in now, would not be prosecuted. Put another way, this action is a 
sport, which is not exactly what one would expect to find in a national regulatory 
enforcement program.124 
 
After concluding that EPA had not issued any interpretation of modification to which the 
court should defer, the district court adopted its own preferred interpretation of 
modification: 
 
Emissions increases, for purposes of NSR/PSD analysis, are calculated only on 
the basis of “maximum hourly emission rates”, not “annual actual emissions”. 
Maximum hourly emissions must increase before PSD permitting is triggered; 
greater facility utilization is irrelevant to the analysis.125 
 
The Fourth Circuit addressed the same issues in a virtually identical context in its 
2005 opinion in United States v. Duke Energy Corp.126 The court held that modification 
was ambiguous with respect to the meaning of an increase in emissions.127 Thus, the 
court emphasized that EPA has the power to adopt by rule either of the competing 
definitions of modification.128 The court also concluded, however, that Congress did not 
give EPA discretion to interpret modification to have different meanings in the contexts 
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of the NSPS and PSD programs.129 The court recognized that Congress can, and 
sometimes does, permit an agency to define the same statutory term in different ways 
when the term is used for different purposes, and the court recognized that there are “vital 
differences” between the PSD and NSPS programs.130 Still, the court concluded that the 
language Congress used in the 1977 amendment unambiguously required EPA to define 
modification the same way for both purposes.131 To the Fourth Circuit, the critical 
sentence in the definition section of the 1977 PSD amendments was: “The term 
‘construction’ when used in connection with any source or modification includes the 
modification (as defined in [the analogous section of the NSPS provisions]) of any source 
or facility.”132 Since all parties, including EPA, agreed that EPA had issued a rule in 1975 
that excluded increases in emissions attributable to increased output from the definition 
of modification in NSPS, the court concluded that EPA was required to use the same 
definition for purposes of PSD unless and until EPA issues a rule that changes the 
definition of modification for both purposes.133 
The third 2005 opinion that discussed the interpretation of modification was the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in New York v. EPA.134 The issue arose in a different context in 
that case, however. The court reviewed the validity of the rule EPA issued in 2003. That 
rule interpreted modification to exclude most projects that increase emissions by enabling 
a facility to increase its output by allowing a facility owner to choose any year in a ten 
year lookback period to use as the baseline from which to determine whether an increase 
in emissions has occurred and by excluding any increase in emissions that is attributable 
only to growth in the demand for the output of the facility.135 The court first held that the 
statutory definition of modification was ambiguous and then upheld EPA’s new 
interpretation of that term as reasonable.136 Since the interpretation was announced in a 
legislative rule, the court applied Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation.137  
The court noted that EPA “is entitled to balance environmental concerns with 
economic and administrative concerns.”138 That is clearly what EPA did when it issued 
its 2003 rule. Of course, EPA engaged in the same balancing process when it adopted the 
quite different interpretation of modification for the purpose of taking the plethora of 
enforcement actions it initiated in 1999 and 2000. The difference in the outcomes of the 
two balancing processes should come as no surprise to anyone who follows politics. The 
1999-2000 EPA interpretation was reflective of the policies of President Clinton, while 
the 2003 interpretation was reflective of the policies of President Bush. Indeed, in 2005 
EPA proposed a new definition of modification that would give facility owners even 
greater discretion to make large changes to their old facilities without having to obtain a 
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PSD permit or to install the extraordinarily expensive pollution control equipment 
required to comply with the PSD rules.139 
  
C. Doctrinal Critique of the Opinions Interpreting Modification 
 
It is particularly important to determine whether the five recent court opinions that 
review EPA’s interpretations of modification are doctrinally sound. The Supreme Court 
is likely to resolve this dispute eventually, and the Court is likely to resolve it through 
application of prevailing doctrines. Thus, a hypothetical doctrinally-sound resolution of 
the issue is likely to replace the doctrinally-flawed and inconsistent lower court opinions 
that have been issued through 2005.     
The two courts that issued opinions in which they reviewed EPA’s interpretation 
of modification in 2003 held that Congress unambiguously resolved the question of how 
to determine whether a major construction project implemented at a facility increases its 
emissions of a pollutant and, hence, constitutes a modification for PSD purposes.140 The 
reasoning in each of those opinions detracts from the plausibility of the conclusion in the 
other, however, since each court concluded that Congress clearly resolved the issue in a 
manner diametrically opposed to the other court’s conclusion.141 The three courts that 
issued opinions on this issue in 2005 concluded that the statutory definition of 
modification is ambiguous in its potential application to a facility that has increased its 
total emissions solely because it has increased its output even though the changes made to 
the facility decreased its rate of emissions per unit of output.142 
The courts that concluded that the statutory term is ambiguous have the better of 
this argument. The CAA defines modification with reference to a project that has the 
effect of increasing emissions of any pollutant, but it leaves the term “increase” 
undefined.143 In that situation, increase can refer either to an increase in aggregate 
emissions due solely to an increase in output or to an increase in the rate of emissions per 
unit of output. As the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit concluded, giving meaning to 
the term increase in the context of the PSD provisions of CAA requires some institution 
to make a policy decision in which it must balance the two conflicting goals of the Clean 
Air Act – reducing air pollution and enhancing or preserving economic prosperity.144  
When EPA interprets modification in a manner that permits a facility owner to 
implement a project that simultaneously reduces emissions per unit and increases output 
from the facility without having to comply with the expensive PSD rules, it is arguably 
furthering the policy goals of the CAA by refraining from inadvertently discouraging 
utilities from implementing socially-beneficial projects that allow utilities to continue to 
generate electricity in the lowest cost facilities available today with a resulting decrease 
in emissions of pollutants per unit of electricity generated. When EPA interprets 
modification in a manner that has the effect of applying the PSD rules to almost any 
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project implemented at an old, high-polluting plant, it is arguably furthering the policy 
goals of CAA by encouraging the owners of the highest polluting sources of electricity in 
the country to replace those old facilities with modern, low-polluting facilities. The two 
district courts that adopted their own interpretations of modification ignored the Supreme 
Court’s admonition in Chevron that politically unaccountable judges should not substitute 
their own policy preferences for those of a politically accountable agency.145 The three 
courts that concluded that modification is ambiguous acted in a manner that was true to 
the Chevron doctrine.  
The D.C. Circuit concluded that the statutory term modification is ambiguous and 
then upheld as reasonable EPA’s interpretation of that rule announced in its 2003 rule.146 
Since the rule is legislative, the D.C. Circuit properly invoked Chevron deference in the 
process of upholding EPA’s interpretation.147                
Even though it concluded that modification is ambiguous, the Fourth Circuit also 
concluded that Congress had unambiguously required EPA to define modification in the 
same manner for purposes of both the NSPS program and the PSD program.148 That 
conclusion had the effect of requiring EPA to define modification to exclude a change in 
a facility that increases emissions only by enabling the facility to increase its output for 
PSD purposes because EPA had issued a legislative rule in 1975 that defined 
modification in that manner in the context of the NSPS program.149 If the Fourth Circuit 
is right with respect to its conclusion that Congress required EPA to give modification the 
same meaning for both purposes, the rest of the court’s conclusions follow logically 
through application of well-established administrative law doctrines. A court owes 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute 
when the agency announces that interpretation in a legislative rule, and an agency can 
only amend a legislative rule by issuing another legislative rule.150 I believe that the 
Fourth Circuit was wrong to conclude that EPA lacks the discretion to adopt different 
interpretations of modification for NSPS and PSD purposes, however.151 In any event, the 
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Fourth Circuit recognized that EPA could change its 1975 interpretation of modification 
for purposes of both the PSD program and the NSPS program, but it could only do so by 
using the cumbersome and time-consuming legislative rulemaking process to amend its 
pre-existing legislative rule that defined modification for purposes of the NSPS 
program.152  
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama concluded that 
modification is ambiguous and stated that “in the abstract,” it was required to defer to any 
reasonable EPA interpretation of modification.153 The court then refused to defer to the 
interpretation EPA announced in its 2003 rule because, even though EPA announced that 
interpretation in a form that renders it subject to Chevron deference, the rule has 
prospective effect only, and all of the conduct at issue before the court took place prior to 
2003.154 The court also refused to defer to the contrary interpretation EPA urged in its 
brief submitted in the case before the court because that interpretation was announced in 
a form that entitled it only to the weaker and contingent form of deference the Court 
described in Skidmore.155 The court concluded that the interpretation EPA urged in its 
brief was not entitled to Skidmore deference because it was inconsistent both with EPA’s 
prior interpretation announced by a senior enforcement official in 1980 and with EPA’s 
present interpretation reflected in EPA’s 2003 rule.156 Lacking any agency interpretation 
to which it was willing to defer, the court announced and applied its own preferred 
interpretation – a facility has been modified for PSD purposes only if it has been changed 
in a way that increases its emissions per unit of output.157 
The District Court applied prevailing doctrine when it declined to defer 
retroactively to the interpretation EPA announced in its 2003 rule, but it departed from 
applicable doctrine when it held that the interpretation EPA urged in its brief was entitled 
only to Skidmore deference. The interpretation EPA adopted and announced in the 
context of bringing the enforcement actions it initiated in 1999-2000 was not just an 
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interpretation of ambiguous language in an agency-administered statute, it was also an 
interpretation of the ambiguous language in the legislative rule EPA issued in 1980. As 
such, it was entitled to Seminole Rock deference. That form of deference is stronger than 
Skidmore deference and, unlike Skidmore deference, it is not contingent on consistency in 
the agency’s interpretation of the rule.158 Moreover, unlike Chevron deference, Seminole 
Rock deference necessarily applies to agency interpretations announced through use of 
procedures less formal than notice and comment rulemaking or a decision issued in a 
formal adjudication.159 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a court must confer 
Seminole Rock deference on at least some agency interpretations of ambiguous agency 
rules that are announced only as litigating positions in briefs.160 
Seminole Rock requires a court to give an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
rule “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”161 The District Court did not conclude, and could not have concluded, that 
the agency’s 1999 interpretation of its ambiguous 1980 rule was either “plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the regulation,” so the court should have deferred to that 
interpretation. There are three bases on which the court might have attempted to defend 
its decision not to defer to EPA’s interpretation of its 1980 rule, but the court did not 
mention any of the three.162 I will discuss those potential bases for escaping from the duty 
to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a rule in section IVE.     
The District Court also departed from precedent when it gave the ambiguous term 
modification the court’s own preferred meaning. A court has no choice but to adopt its 
own preferred construction of an ambiguous provision in an agency-administered statute 
when the agency has not announced an interpretation to which the court can defer.163 
That was not the situation the district court confronted, however. It was required to defer 
to EPA’s interpretation of its 1980 rule, and since that rule is a legislative rule, EPA’s 
interpretation of that rule also resolves the ambiguity in the statutory definition of 
modification. 
                              
                                  
D. Normative Critique of the Opinions on the Meaning of Modification 
 
In section IVC, I concluded that the three 2005 opinions that reviewed EPA 
interpretations of the term modification, as that term is used in the PSD provisions of 
CAA, accurately applied prevailing doctrines when they concluded that the term is 
ambiguous, that the D.C. Circuit acted in a manner consistent with prevailing doctrine 
when it upheld the interpretation of modification EPA announced in its 2003 rule, and 
that the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama accurately applied prevailing 
doctrine when it declined to apply the statutory interpretation EPA announced in its 2003 
rule retroactively. I also concluded that the District Court for the Northern District of 
Alabama acted in a manner inconsistent with prevailing doctrine when it refused to defer 
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to EPA’s interpretation of its 1980 rule defining modification and when it adopted its 
own preferred interpretation of the statutory term modification. Finally, I concluded that 
the Fourth Circuit was wrong when it concluded that EPA must give modification the 
same meaning in the context of both the NSPS program and the PSD program.  
If my doctrinal critique is correct, any court that applies prevailing doctrines 
accurately to the scores of pending EPA CAA enforcement actions will have no choice 
but to defer to EPA’s 1999 interpretation of modification that it is continuing to urge 
courts to apply in its ongoing enforcement proceedings in 2005. I am troubled by that 
result for two reasons, however. First, like the results of applying prevailing doctrines in 
Dow,164 it has the effect of requiring a court in 2005 to reject the policy preferred by the 
incumbent President in favor of the contrary policy of his predecessor, even though the 
incumbent took office four years earlier in 2001. Second, I share the concerns about 
fairness and regularity expressed by the District Judge in the Alabama Power case.165 It 
does not seem right to conclude that a firm violated the law during the period between 
1980 and 1999, and to require the firm to incur hundreds of millions of dollars of 
mandated costs, based on an interpretation of an ambiguous rule and statute that the 
government did not announce until 1999, when the firm acted on the basis of the 
agency’s contrary interpretation announced in 1980 and when a court would have to 
conclude that the firm acted in an entirely lawful manner if its conduct were to be judged 
with reference to the definitive interpretation of the statute the agency announced in 
2003. 
 
E. Potential Changes in Doctrine 
 
My concerns about the unfortunate results of the application of prevailing 
doctrines to the dispute with respect to the meaning of modification motivates me to 
consider critically whether today’s prevailing doctrines make sense or whether we should 
change one or more of those doctrines.  
There are several changes in doctrine that could avoid the two adverse effects of 
applying prevailing doctrine in these problematic enforcement cases. The Supreme Court 
could overrule Seminole Rock and substitute a less powerful and more contingent form of 
deference for Seminole Rock deference. Such a change in doctrine would allow a court to 
refuse to defer to EPA’s 1999 interpretation of its 1980 rule. That, in turn, would allow a 
court to adopt an interpretation of modification that is consistent with the policy 
preferences of the incumbent President and that would avoid penalizing firms for 
engaging in conduct that they had no reason to believe was unlawful at the time the firms 
engaged in the conduct.  
John Manning wrote an excellent article in 1996 in which he urged just such a 
change in doctrine.166 Manning argued that courts should not confer a strong form of 
deference on agency interpretations of ambiguous agency rules because such a doctrine 
of deference encourages agencies to issue ambiguous rules.167 Manning makes some 
good points, but I do not support his proposed change in doctrine for two reasons. First, 
                                                 
164 See text at notes 72-73 supra. 
165 see text at notes 122-124 supra. 
166 Manning, supra. note 15. 
167 Id. at 631-680. 
 29
as Manning acknowledges, adoption of his proposal would have costs of three types: it 
would increase the power of politically unaccountable judges to substitute their own 
preferred policies for those of politically accountable agencies; it would discourage 
agencies from issuing rules; and, it would delay final resolution of many policy 
disputes.168 I believe those costs exceed the benefits of the doctrinal change Manning 
urges. Second, while adoption of Manning’s proposal would have a salutary effect in the 
context of the pending CAA enforcement disputes, it would have the opposite effect in 
most cases. One of the few ways in which an agency can change its policies to reflect 
those of the incumbent President expeditiously is to adopt an interpretation of an 
ambiguous agency rule. Seminole Rock then requires a court to defer to the agency 
interpretation. Thus, by overruling Seminole Rock, the Court would be exacerbating the 
problem of delay between the time a President is elected and the time when the courts 
will allow his policy preferences to replace those of his predecessor. 
There are three more modest changes in existing doctrines that offer some 
potential to avoid the adverse effects of applying existing doctrines in the CAA 
enforcement cases, however. Each has some support in judicial decisions.  
First, courts, including the Supreme Court, have begun to refuse to defer to 
agency interpretations of ambiguous agency rules where the rules were written in an 
extraordinarily open-ended manner.169 The Tenth Circuit explained the basis for this 
judicial tendency in a 1998 opinion.170 In that case, the agency had issued a rule that did 
little more than parrot the open-ended language of the statute the rule was supposed to 
implement. The agency then attempted to rely entirely on informal interpretations of its 
open-ended rule to announce all of its interpretations of the statute the rule was supposed 
to implement. The court noted that Congress authorizes agencies to issue rules to 
implement statutes primarily to provide a means through which an agency can 
particularize the often vague and open-ended commands contained in regulatory 
statutes.171 The court refused to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its rule because, by 
doing so, the court would encourage agencies to substitute regulatory ambiguity for 
statutory ambiguity, thereby making a “mockery of  .  .  .  the [Administrative Procedure 
Act].”172 The D.C. Circuit has provided a more colorful explanation for this limit on 
Seminole Rock deference: “An agency cannot create mush and then give it form only 
through subsequent less formal ‘interpretations.’”173   
Application of that reasoning to the CAA enforcement cases would avoid the 
results that concern me. It would provide a basis to refuse to defer to the 1999 
interpretation of modification, thereby allowing a court to adopt instead the 2003 
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interpretation as its own. More broadly, general application of this reasoning would have 
the beneficial effects of adoption of Manning’s proposal without incurring the high costs 
attendant to adoption of the Manning proposal. The disadvantage of this approach lies in 
the difficulty of drawing the line between a rule that an agency is free to interpret because 
it is merely ambiguous and a rule that adds so little to a vague provision of a statute that a 
court should not confer deference on an agency interpretation of the rule. The Supreme 
Court divided five-four and six-to-three in resolving three such line-drawing disputes in 
the 1990s.174 As difficult as it may be to draw that line in some cases, however, I believe 
it is a line worth drawing. A good argument can be made that the 1980 rule EPA 
interpreted in bringing its enforcement proceedings in 1999 added so little to the vague 
statutory definition of modification that courts should not defer to agency interpretations 
of that rule. 
A second promising approach is for a court to refuse to defer to an agency 
interpretation of a rule when that interpretation is announced only as a litigating position 
and when there is reason to believe that the interpretation is not the “agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the issue.”175 The D.C. Circuit explained the basis for its 
reluctance to defer to agency interpretations of rules announced only as litigating 
positions in a 1997 opinion: 
 
This reluctance to defer to agency counsel stems from two concerns. First, .  .  .  
counsel’s interpretation may not reflect the views of the agency itself  .  .  .   . 
Second, it is likely that a position established only in litigation may have been 
developed hastily, or under special pressure, and is not the result of the agency’s 
deliberative processes. However, as the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, 
deference to an interpretation offered in the course of litigation is still proper as 
long as it reflects the “agency’s fair and considered judgment.”176 
 
The D.C. Circuit’s approach makes a lot of sense. Agency supervision of agency lawyers 
is highly uneven. Sometimes the positions a lawyer proposes to take in litigation have 
been discussed and approved at the highest levels of the agency. In other cases, however, 
no policymaking official has even considered, much less approved, the position the 
lawyer is taking in litigation.  
If a court were to apply this approach to the interpretation of the 1980 rule that 
EPA is urging in the pending enforcement cases, it would have little difficulty concluding 
that the interpretation is not the agency’s “fair and considered judgment on the issue.” 
After all, the policymaking officials in the agency have announced policies in 2003 and 
2005 that are the opposite of the positions the agency’s lawyers have taken in the 
enforcement proceedings during the same time period. This strange situation strongly 
supports the inference that the agency’s lawyers are engaged in a frolic of their own in 
the pending enforcement cases. 
                                                 
174 See cases cited in note 169, supra.  
175 The Court held that courts should defer to agency interpretations of agency rules announced in briefs 
when they represent the agency’s “fair and considered judgment on the issue.” 519 U.S. at 462. By 
implication, a court should not defer to such an interpretation when it does not represent the agency’s “fair 
and considered judgment on the issue.”   
176 National Wildlife Federation v. Browner, 127 F. 3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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 Third, a court could justify a refusal to defer to EPA’s 1999 interpretation of its 
1980 rule based on an equitable extension of an administrative law doctrine that is rooted 
in the due process clause. Courts regularly refuse to defer to agency interpretations of 
ambiguous rules in the context of enforcement proceedings in which agencies seek to 
impose penalties on firms for violating agency rules. A court will impose a penalty on a 
firm for violating an ambiguous agency rule only if the court concludes that the agency 
provided the firm with adequate notice that the firm’s conduct would violate the rule 
before the firm engaged in the conduct that is the basis for the agency’s attempt to impose 
a penalty for violating the rule.177  
Direct application of this constitutionally-based doctrine to the CAA enforcement 
cases would have some beneficial effects. Since EPA fell far short of providing adequate 
notice of its 1999 interpretation of its 1980 rule before the firms implemented the changes 
to their facilities during the 1980-1999 period, EPA cannot rely on its 1999 interpretation 
as the basis to penalize the firms for engaging in that pre-1999 conduct. That direct effect 
of the adequate notice requirement would provide little real relief to the firms who are 
defendants in those actions, however. If a court determines that a firm violated the rule, 
and thus the statute, by making a change in its facility that constituted a “modification” 
during the 1980-1999 period, the firm is required to install new pollution control 
technology that costs up to one billion dollars per facility, or to abandon the facility, in 
order to comply with the PSD provisions of CAA. I doubt that those costs qualify as a 
penalty for purposes of invocation of the adequate notice requirement. 178 
 A court would have to be willing to extend the adequate warning requirement, or 
something like it, to the context of costs of compliance with regulatory statutes, as well as 
penalties, in order to relieve the defendants in these enforcement cases from having to 
incur scores of billions of dollars of costs for engaging in conduct that they reasonably 
believed to be free of all regulatory costs at the time they took those actions. Two recent 
precedents – a 2003 opinion of the Sixth Circuit 179and a 2004 opinion of the First 
Circuit180 -- support just such an extension of the adequate notice requirement in 
circumstances in which an agency has affirmatively misled regulates. Both opinions 
involved attempts by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to rely on a new interpretation of 
an agency rule in enforcement actions as the basis for its claim that regulatees were 
required to make extremely expensive changes in their facilities. 
 In 1992, DOJ issued a rule to implement the Americans with Disabilities Act. The 
rule required owners of movie theaters to provide seating for disabled individuals that 
provide the individuals with “lines of sight comparable” to those enjoyed by non-disabled 
people.181 DOJ proceeded to announce myriad inconsistent interpretations of that rule 
over the following decade.182 Then, in 2000, DOJ initiated enforcement actions against 
several firms that had built many hundreds of new theaters during the time the rule was in 
                                                 
177 E.g., Upton v. SEC, 75 F. 3d 92 (2d Cir. 1996); General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F. 3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). See the discussion of numerous other cases with the same reasoning and holding in Pierce, supra. 
note 61, at §6.11. 
178 For discussion of what constitutes a penalty, see Pierce, supra. note 61, at §6.11.  
179 United States v. Cinemark, 348 F. 3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003) 
180 United States v. Hoyt’s Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004). 
181 Standard 4.33.3, 28 C.F.R. §§36.401-.402, 36.406 (2003). 
182 380 F. 3d at 563, 569; 348 F.3d at 573-574. 
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effect.183 Each of the theaters complied with the rule, as it had been interpreted at the time 
the theater was built, but none complied with the rule as DOJ interpreted it for the first 
time in the enforcement proceedings. Both the Sixth Circuit and the First Circuit upheld 
DOJ’s new interpretation of the ambiguous rule, but both also concluded that the 
defendants did not have adequate notice of the interpretation to justify imposition of 
penalties against them.184 Both courts then referred to the need for the district courts to 
apply equitable principles in the enforcement actions on remand.185 In the words of the 
First Circuit: 
 
Due process may furnish a floor [against having to make large expenditures] 
based primarily on lack of fair warning, but we think that equitable principles give 
the district court even greater latitude to decline or limit retroactivity. For 
example, the court might equitably consider not only the level of warning but also 
government indolence or misleading advice and the avoidance of extravagant 
expenditure for little gain.186 
 
The equitable considerations alluded to by the First Circuit apply a fortiori to the pending 
CAA enforcement proceedings. The government should not be able to play gotcha with 
regulatees by first announcing an interpretation of a rule in 1980 that encourages them to 
make large capital investments in improvements to their facilities by assuring them that 
they are not thereby subjecting themselves to massive regulatory costs, and then in 1999 
announcing a new interpretation that requires them to choose between spending billions 
of dollars on those facilities or closing them.  
If EPA had announced its 1999 interpretation of modification in 1980, owners of 
most old, coal-fired generating plants would have closed them rather than spending close 
to a billion dollars on each to comply with PSD. Perhaps that would have been the better 
policy decision in 1980 – though it would have increased our dependence on oil imported 
from the middle east, increased the price of electricity significantly, and increased the 
severity of the stagflation conditions that then plagued the economy. Perhaps that would 
be the better policy decision today. EPA should be, and is, free to make that policy 
decision at any time as long as it makes the decision for prospective application only. 
EPA should not be free, however, to make that policy decision in 1999 with retroactive 
application to conduct that took place before 1999. 
 
                                        V. CONCLUSION 
 
My analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dow and of the court decisions 
issued in response to the Clinton Administration’s efforts to redefine modification for 
CAA PSD purposes has uncovered what I believe to be two serious problems that are 
attributable to our current administrative law doctrines. First, a newly elected President 
often cannot get his policies announced in a form that courts will accept for many years 
after he is elected. This produces such a large lag between the election of a President and 
                                                 
183 380 F. 3d at 563-564; 548 F. 3d at 574-575. 
184 380 F. 3d at 571-573; 548 F. 3d at 578-579, 581-582. 
185 380 F. 3d at 573-574; 348 F. 3d at 581-583.   
186 380 F. 3d at 573. 
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judicial acquiescence in his preferred policies that the policies the government is 
implementing are at least one, and often two, Presidential elections behind. Second, 
through judicial application of our present deference doctrines, it is quite possible to get a 
situation in which regulatees are required to make extremely large regulatory 
expenditures for having taken actions in the past that would be free of regulatory costs 
today and that the government encouraged them to take at the time they took the actions.                                
The first problem is attributable in large measure to the Supreme Court’s refusal 
to defer to an agency’s policy decision reflected in a statutory interpretation unless and 
until the agency announces that decision in either a legislative rule or a decision issued in 
a formal adjudication. To reduce the magnitude of the time lag problem, I urge the 
Supreme Court to adopt Justice Scalia’s proposed broader approach to Chevron 
deference. A court should confer Chevron deference on an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of ambiguous language in an agency-administered statute whenever the 
agency announces its interpretation in a manner that reflects the agency’s “fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question.” 
The second problem is attributable in part to the willingness of court’s to defer to 
agency interpretations of ambiguous agency rules in enforcement proceedings even when 
the interpretation urged in the enforcement proceeding is inconsistent with both the 
interpretation of the rule the agency announced before the conduct at issue took place and 
with the agency’s current rules. I urge courts to respond to that problem by qualifying 
deference doctrine in three ways that have some support in the case law – a court should 
not defer to an agency interpretation of  an agency rule that is open-ended and that merely 
parrots the vague language of the statute it purports to implement; a court should not 
defer to an agency interpretation of a rule when the interpretation is announced only as a 
litigating position and when there is reason to believe that the interpretation does not 
reflect the agency’s “fair and considered judgment on the issue;” and, a court should not 
allow an agency to apply retroactively a new interpretation of an ambiguous rule when 
the result would be to compel a regulatee to make large regulatory expenditures because 
of conduct the agency encouraged the regulatee to take.                                      
                                                                                                   
